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Bythe time of the devaluation in June 1966, the government's efforts at lib-
eralization had gathered some momentum. None of them, however, yet repre-
sented anything more than partial and halting measures. In particular, the
exchange rate remained overvalued: import premia remained high and export
subsidies had steadily been mounting to offset, however inefficiently, the ad-
verse effects of the overvaluation on export performance. In fact, with the
Indo-Pakistan War in late 1965 and the suspension of aid thereafter, the
shortage of foreign exchange and the resulting rise in import premia had be-
come serious.
The major thotivating factors underlying the decision to devalue were
twofold: (1) the adjustment of the parity in a situation of overvaluation
seemed to fit in rather well with the government's earlier, slow attempts aimed
rather at reducing the ill-effects of the overvaluation of the parity by offsetting
measures such as export subsidization; and (2) more important, the Aid-India
Consortium had virtually made a major devaluation a precondition for the
resumption of aid, leaving the government little maneuverability because of the
acute shortage of foreign exchange.
These two factors bear critically on both the policy package that went
with the devaluation and on the outcome of the policy package. The fact that
a major impulse behind the devaluation was the growing realization that the
export subsidies and tariffs were only an inadequate and inefficient substitute
for the formal parity change that was called for, meant that the government
desired the devaluation primarily to substitute for the existing measures.
Hence the degree of the devaluation was to reflect mainly the existing levels
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of export subsidization and only partially to go beyond that. The formal parity
change was therefore accompanied by a substantial elimination of the export
subsidies and a significant reduction of the tariffs that had been increasingly
used during Phase II in lieu of devaluation. The pressures applied by the aid
donors to bring about the parity change, with the continuation of aid (at the
normal levels prior to aid suspension in 1965) made presumably conditional
on devaluation, also meant that another major aspect of the policy change was
supposed to be a significant rise in the immediate availability of aid-financed
imports, accompanied by an official commitment (in principle) to a policy
of liberalized imports.
The full policy package, as we shall hereafter describe it, consisted of
(1) the formal parity change resulting in a devaluation of the Indian rupee;
(2) a substantial elimination of the export incentives on non-traditional ex-
ports, a simultaneous imposition of countervailing duties to offset the devalua-
tion on traditional exports where oligopolistic competition from rival suppliers
was expected (as on tea) and a significant reduction of the high import duties;
and (3) a significant increase in the availability of aid-financed imports, ac-
companied by official declaration and implementation of a policy of liberal-
ized import licensing.
In evaluating the outcome of the "liberalization episode" (in the Bhag-
wati-Krueger terminology) that this policy package constituted, we will also
have to take into account the following factors:
1. an early revival, already in 1966, of subsidization on the export of
major non-traditional exports;
2. a second, disastrous agricultural drought in 1966—67, which led to
wage-good-scarcity-induced price increases;
3. a resulting deceleration in monetary expansion and in fiscal expendi-
tures during 1966—67, which reflected fears of adding to the price
increases;
4. a similarly motivated shift in the composition of fiscal expenditures
temporarily away from capital to current expenditures; and
5. a massively adverse political reaction to the devaluation, largely in
view of its having been widely regarded to be a result of pressures exercised
by the Aid-India Consortium.
In the analysis that follows, we begin in Chapter 6 by quantifying the net
devaluation when the parity change has been adjusted for the simultaneous
removal of the export subsidies in the shape of the import entitlement schemes,
the imposition of countervailing duties on traditional exports and the reduc-
tion of import duties. In Chapter 7, we then trace the different kinds of export
subsidization that did carry over from the pre-devaluation period and the
important new subsidies that were introduced in the post-devaluation period;
and we attempt quantification of these subsidies, essentially to develop veryTHE DIMENSIONS OF THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODE 85
broadorders of magnitude. Then it is possible for us to analyze carefully the
different dimensions of the economy: price level and economic activity in
Chapter 8 and export performance in Chapter 9. Since the role of the Western
aid donors in bringing about the devaluation was critical, the political impli-
cations of their involvement as well as their interaction with the outcome of
theliberalizationepisode are discussed in Chapter 10. Finally, several major
lessons—for India, for developing countries and for donor-developed coun-
t:ries—are drawn together from this analysis in Chapter :11. The relapse of the
economy into Phase II by 1968—70, rather than its transition to Phase IV,
is also noted there.